Biographical Information
Nigel Rylatt got a BA (Hon) degree in history from the Open University in the UK. He had a very keen interest in literature of various sorts, but his main reading interests were military and political history, contemporary politics and defence and international security. He spend a lot of time listening to BBC Radio 4. Most of its programmes appealed to him, however, the categories of programme he found to be of most interest were News and Current Affairs, Drama, History and Science. To find out more about Nigel Rylatt please visit his
About Page.
Before he passed away, Nigel wrote a book about the battles around Imphal and Kohima on the Burma/India border during the later part of the Second World War. This book has not been been published, but for those who know little or nothing about the Imphal/Kohima Campaign below are some details.
The Imphal/Kohima Campaign which was fought between March and July 1944 was important to the course of the fighting in Burma because it thwarted the plans of the Japanese in India. The operation launched by the Japanese XV Army had two main aims:-
- To capture the important base at Imphal which was the main collection point for the personnel and equipment which were to be used for the proposed re-conquest of Burma by the XIV Army. The Imphal plain was also important to British Plans because it was the location of six airfields.
- It was planned that a 'puppet government' would be created in the states of Bengal and Orissa. The intention was that this regime would start riots, and ultimately a revolt that would destabilise British Rule.
The objective of the attack on Kohima was to sever the Imphal to Dimapur road. It should be mentioned that Dimapur was an important railhead and supply base for both the British/Indian and the American Forces then in the Burma theatre; indeed, at that time, both American and British formations were fighting inside Burma.
Although the campaign began earlier than the British expected, they had contingency plans in place. Therefore both 17th and 20th Indian Divisions then in forward positions, were able to make orderly withdrawals to the Imphal Plain. Eventually these formations, and 23rd Indian Division, were able to tie down the Japanese 15th and 33rd divisions which stopped them capturing the important equipment and supplies mentioned above.
The ground forces were, throughout these operations, given excellent support by the fighters and fighter-bombers of the Royal Air Force. Furthermore, as Imphal was under siege, all food, stores and supplies had to be flown in by transport aircraft of both the RAF and the United States Air Force. The main transport aircraft used was the ubiquitous Dakota. However, as there was not enough of this type of aircraft, another US transport aircraft called the Commando supplemented them. This was in shape rather like an enlarged Dakota. Its main advantage was that it could carry one and a half times the cargo load of the Dakota. Therefore equipment could be stockpiled more quickly. Also, at an early stage of the campaign, the transport aircraft were used to fly men of both 5th and 7th Indian Divisions to both Imphal and Dimapur, so that they could bolster the garrison at Imphal, and the formation that would fight at Kohima.
The fighting on the Imphal Plain was carried out at such an intense pitch that twin engined Wellington Bombers of the RAF, and twin engined Mitchell Bombers of the USAAF were used to fly in ammunition for both the Army and RAF, together with bombs for the fighter bombers of the RAF. Eventually the Japanese were forced to realise that they were not going to win. Consequently they began to withdraw. However, they certainly did not flee! They made the garrison at Imphal fight extremely hard to regain lost ground. Although the Japanese still had to be beaten, the siege of Imphal was lifted on 22nd June 1944.
Two weeks after the main part of the Japanese XV Army had laid siege to Imphal, the Japanese 31st Division advanced on Kohima. As Kohima was at that time mainly a military hospital, and a reinforcement depot, a large percentage of the original defenders were either patients or soldiers waiting to return to their units. Soon after the Japanese attacked Kohima, a British Battalion, the 4th Queens Own Royal West Kent Regiment was able to enter Kohima. They, together with the 1st Battalion of the Assam Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the Assam Rifles were the only cohesive units inside Kohima. So, to an extent, they bore the brunt of the fighting. Indeed, the two Indian Army Battalions acquitted themselves especially well in their first pitched battle.
This force was under siege for two weeks and was relieved by two more Indian Battalions who had been in action a short distance away at a point between Kohima and Dimapur, which was North East of Kohima. 48 hours late, the whole force was itself relieved by 2nd (British) Division, and later the 7th Indian Division. When complete this force was 20-25,000 strong. In view of the tenacity of the Japanese attackers it took a further seven weeks of very intense action to dislodge them from their positions in Kohima. As Kohima was also besieged, and no personnel or equipment could be transported there by road for at least some of the time, the soldiers there also had to receive their supplies by airdrop as at Imphal. The final Japanese position just to the South of Kohima was regained on 6th June (the day of the Normandy Landings in France). The advance to relieve Imphal was then able to begin.
Although, as mentioned above, the Japanese severed the Imphal/Dimapur Road in two places, the forces that cut the road were not left unscathed by the actions of the British Forces. They were constantly attacked by a formation that had been specially trained for guerilla warfare. Whilst all the British and Indian Forces received excellent air support, this was not the case for the Japanese as their air force was in very poor shape. Furthermore, as when the Japanese had begun their advance they had taken a herd of cattle and a herd of goats for food, they ran short of food very quickly. Also as they had no vehicles there was no means by which their supplies could be conveyed to the area of operations. The lack of vehicles was due to the fact that they had been unable to capture the vehicles stockpiled at Imphal. By late July, not one Japanese soldier was fighting on the Imphal Plain. In December of 1944, the Japanese XV Army was about to begin its withdrawal through Burma.
Both before and throughout the campaign both sides had access to excellent, and very detailed, intelligence about both the present and future intentions of their opponents. Two incidents from 1943 are illuminating examples of this. Towards the end of the year, a Japanese party led by Lieutenant Nishida made an extremely thorough reconnaissance survey of the Imphal/Kohima area that provided XV Army with a very clear idea of the terrain they would be fighting over. In December, a British agent called Goldberg held a very secret meeting with a Burmese priest called U Nandiya. Until very recently, the priest had worked for the Japanese. Consequently, he had learned a great deal about Japanese plans including information about the proposed attack on North East India. Therefore, it was this information that he passed on to Goldberg. In view of the significance of this information, U Nandiya was promised that if he was put on trail at the end of hostilities, Goldberg would speak up for him.
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